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The rapid depletion of natural resources has led to a greater focus on sustainable 
management systems. This case study examines the challenges faced by the 
Japanese whaling industry, in an environmentally conscious world. Strategies 
adopted by Japan to promote whaling in the midst of growing concern by members 
of the International Whaling Commission, special interest groups and non-whaling 
countries are discussed. 
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JAPANESE WHALING STRATEGIES 
 
 
“Fifty of the humpback whales that recently 
passed by Sydney could be targeted by the 
Japanese ‘scientific whaling’ program in the 
Southern Ocean, and their meat processed 
into whale burgers or fried and seasoned 
with soy sauce” (Smyth, 2005). 
 
 
During the past decade there has been increasing global concern over the depletion 
of natural resources. It is widely accepted that sustainable management systems are 
essential for the long term preservation of scarce resources. These systems build on 
a balance between the economy, the environment and social responsibility 
(Jørgensen, 2007). Yet, the divergent interests of nations present significant 
challenges in the management of depleting resources. One such resource that is 
rapidly depleting, is the number of whales in the ocean. This case study focuses on 
the global strategies adopted by the Japanese whaling industry in the midst of strong 
objection by several countries who promote whale conservation. The case also 
examines the emotive responses by several special interest groups such as 
Greenpeace, who are genuinely concerned about perceived “cruel hunting tactics” 
adopted by the Japanese whaling industry. 
 
The Whaling Industry 
 
The global whaling industry has changed from a regime that permitted unregulated 
commercial whaling to one with a high level of global conservation and regulation, 
protecting the now endangered species. Whaling has a long history in Japan. The 
practice is thought to have begun more than two thousand years ago and was more 
recently expanded after World War II when Japan used whale meat to cope with 
food shortages (Agence France Presse, 2005a). Whale meat was cheaper than beef 
and was fed to generations of Japanese children in the decades following the War 
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(Simmonds & Johnstone, 1994). This practice was discontinued when uncertainty 
about whale stocks resulted in increases in the cost of whale meat. 
 
The concern over whale numbers eventually led to an International Whaling 
Commission moratorium banning commercial whaling in 1986 (Schaefer, 2003). This 
agreement is not a binding agreement, and allows some whaling under certain 
circumstances (Begley & Hayden, 2000). There are some countries like Japan, that 
maintain whaling industries. Japan’s whaling industry is not strictly commercial. It 
operates under an International Whaling Commission provision for scientific research 
and whales are studied before being sold (Begley & Hayden, 2000; Murray, 2005). 
This program is often criticised as a cover for commercial whaling.  Scientists cite an 
apparent lack of published research from the Japanese scientific research program 
and question the need to kill whales when non-lethal research methods are available 
(Alford, 2005a; Alford, 2005b). 
 
Since the moratorium came into effect in 1986, more than 7000 whales have been 
killed under the banner of scientific whaling research, mainly by Japan (Holmes & 
Graham-Rowe, 2005). However, Japan’s whaling numbers have not fluctuated 
much. Japan has maintained its level of whaling by merely changing its stated 
intention from ‘whale harvesting’ to ‘scientific whaling’. Norway experienced a 
significant increase in whaling between 1992-93 and 1997-98. During the 
subsequent years, Norway harvested between 500 to 600 whales each year (see 
Figure 1). Norway is able to maintain the only commercial whaling industry in the 
world as it did not sign the International Whaling Commission moratorium (Agence 
France Presse, 2005b). Iceland does not have a commercial whaling industry, but 
continues whaling under provisions for scientific research (Alford, 2005a; Begley & 
Hayden, 2000). Indigenous communities from various nations hunt small numbers of 
whales under cultural exemptions (Alford, 2005a). 
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Figure 1: The Number of Whales Killed since the International Whaling 
Commission Whaling Moratorium came into effect 




The Japanese have always considered whales as a renewable resource, which is 
why Japan sees whaling as a fisheries and resource use issue (Wong, 2001). 
“Whales are just as important, and no more special, than any other fish,” says Japan 
Fisheries Agency spokesperson Hideki Moronuki, maintaining Japan’s long-held 
position that marine mammals should get no special treatment for being warm-
blooded (Sekiguchi, 2007). The whaling industry is supported by the Japanese 
government, yet faces strong threats from other sources. Japan maintains that with a 
population of around 40,000 humpback whales, growing at 15% a year, the formerly 
endangered humpback has recovered to a sustainable level for lethal research. Anti-
whalers do not agree with these estimates and simply see this as raw defiance. 
"They're just doing this to show us that they can," says Paul Watson, founder of the 
anti-whaling Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (Sekiguchi, 2007). 
 




Japanese whaling is seen by special interest groups such as the World Society for 
the Protection of Animals (WSPA), as a cruel practice which inflicts severe suffering 
on whales. The main method of killing whales is to use a grenade-tipped harpoon. 
The whales are first speared with the harpoon, which sinks thirty centimetres into the 
whale’s flesh, before the grenade detonates. However, Japan’s own statistics 
indicate that 60% of whales do not die immediately and a second harpoon or a rifle is 
often used to kill the whale. It appears that Japanese whalers use minimum amount 
of explosives in order to preserve as much whale meat as possible. Marine Mammal 
Program Manager Claire Bass makes the following observation: “In several of the 
pictures we see harpooned whales alive and fully conscious, thrashing in the water 
and even attempting to dive against the harpoon line in a desperate attempt to 
escape. It is clear that in some cases the harpoon has entirely penetrated the 
whale’s body. One whale was seen blowing blood through its blowhole as a result of 
the devastating internal injuries caused by the harpoon” (World Society for the 
Protection of Animals, 2008). 
 
A report by the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) found that more than 
80% of whales are not killed instantly once harpooned. This is due to the lack of 
ability of harpoon gunners to hit the area close to the whale’s brain. Once 
harpooned, whales are often alive when they are winched into the hunting ship with 
the harpoon embedded into their flesh, causing severe suffering. Many whales that 
are winched in alive, do not die from the blow of the harpoon, but of suffocation, with 
their blow holes forced under water by the process of winching them in. Whales that 
are not killed instantly by the harpoon may struggle from ten to thirty five minutes 
before dying, exhibiting signs of acute suffering during this period. IFAW Australia 
Country Director Mick McIntyre said: “What Japan is doing to whales is not just cruel, 
it’s criminal. The International Whaling Commission has ignored this fact for too long. 
We are very pleased that Australia, a key member of the International Whaling 
Commission, has acknowledged the importance of this report, and has taken a lead 
to raise the issue of cruelty at the meeting of the International Whaling Commission” 
(International Fund for Animal Welfare, 2006). 
 




Japan’s whaling industry is very much a product of the Japanese government 
(Schaefer, 2003; The Economist, 2000). Its primary objective is for a return to 
commercial whaling, and its fall back plan is to pursue increased quotas for scientific 
purposes (Japan Whaling Association, 2005).  
 
The Japanese kill more that 1000 whales per year for scientific research which 
conservationist groups regard as little more than a backdoor to commercial whaling 
(Walsh, et. al. 2005). The International Whaling Commission (2004) says that 
creatures killed for scientific purposes should be processed, opening the door for 
commercialisation of scientific products, and a $38 million per year industry for 
selling whale meat. Scientific whaling is not constrained by a systematic quota 
setting, causing large numbers of whales to continue to be killed (Holmes & Graham-
Rowe, 2005). It is worth noting is that catches of Baird’s beaked whales, Pilot whales 
and Dall’s porpoises occur within Japanese coastal waters (Pacific Whale 
Foundation, 2006). These catches which are destined for the domestic market, are 
outside the International Whaling Commission jurisdiction. About 66 Baird whales 
are taken a year. However, statistics on the other species are not readily available 
(Associated Press, 2006).  
 
The structure of the Japanese whaling industry is under the control of the Japanese 
Government through the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (see Figure 
2). As an affiliated body of the Ministry, the Fisheries Agency entrusts scientific 
whaling to the Institute of Cetacean Research (established in 1987) which contracts 
Kyodo Senpaku (a consolidation of whaling departments) and its 300 employees to 
physically carry out whaling (Greenpeace Japan, 1998-2005). As the sole company 
in Japan to own whaling vessels and operate in the Antarctic, Kyodo Senpaku 
receives its US $45 million annual revenue from the Institute of Cetacean Research, 
in addition to grants from the trade body Japan Whaling Association (The Economist, 
2004).  
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The value chain commences from the Institute of Cetacean Research, which sells 
some 2,000 to 3,000 tonnes of packaged frozen remains of whale meat to the 
Japanese Government in order to cover the costs of research. The government then 
sets the price for the whale meat which can fetch between 3000 to 7000 yen (US 
$30 to US $70) per kilo, depending on the cut. In stark contrast, a Japanese 
customer at a restaurant in Osaka pays about 13000 yen (about US $130) for a 
‘whale set-dinner’ (Ohse, 1993; The Economist, 2000). The meat is first distributed to 
local governments before being sold via wholesale fish markets to department 
stores, restaurants and sushi bars. Interestingly, the Japanese Government retains 
approximately one fifth of the Institute of Cetacean Research whale meat for the 
purposes of promoting the consumption of whale meat (The Economist, 2004). Both 
the structure and value chain of the Japanese whaling industry evidences the close 
relationship between the government, the research institute, the trade association 
and the fishing company (see Figure 3). It also demonstrates the strong role of 
government as regulator, facilitator and customer of the industry. 
 
The Japanese government and Japan Whaling Association are now implementing 
new strategies to increase the demand for whale meat. In order to increase 
Japanese domestic whale consumption, the following measures have been put into 
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place (Holmes & Graham-Rowe, 2005; Smyth, 2005; The Economist, 2004; Walsh, 
Sekiguchi & Toyama, 2005): 
 Price subsidies 
 School lunch menus and whale meat sold in school canteens 
 Giving away blubber ice-cream 
 Cooking demonstrations and publishing cookbooks 
 Advertising campaigns 
 Producing a musical in 2002 to promote whale meat 
 Introduction of whale burgers called the ‘big minke’ at fast food chains such as 
Lucky Pierrot 
 The holding of an annual whale-eating event 
The Japanese government hopes that these promotions will eventually lift the 
demand for whale meat in Japan.  This may explain the keenness of the Japanese to 
resume commercial whaling. 
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Figure 3: The Whaling Value Chain in Japan 































The Research institute sells 2000-
3000 tonnes of whale meat to the 
Japanese government, therefore 
paying for most of the cost of the 
research. A price is set, usually 
about 3000-7000 yen (US $30-70) per 
kilo. 
Whaling outside the International 
Whaling Commission’s jurisdiction: 
Catches of Baird’s beaked whales, 
Pilot whales and Dall’s porpoises 
occur within Japanese coastal 
waters. 
 
Most of the whale meat is 
distributed to government 
agencies, such as local 
governments 
1/5 of the whale meat bought 
from the research institute is 
kept by the central government 
to be used for promoting the 
consumption of whale meat as 
mentioned above  
For example, whale meat is used 
in: 
 Annual whale eating events 
 Cooking demonstrations 
 











The Macro Environment 
 
In order to fully appreciate the strategies adopted by the Japanese, an 
understanding of the macro environment is necessary. Therefore, the macro 
environment is examined below using five factors, namely socio-cultural, 
demographic, economic, political/legal, and technological. Changes in the five 
factors of the macro environment can have a direct impact on any one of the forces 




The Japanese market is the principle market for whale meat and blubber products in 
the world (Greenpeace, 2005). However, whale meat does not appear to be a 
common element in the Japanese diet today (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: Daily Per Capita Consumption of Meat in Japan from 1930-1998 







Greenpeace Japan responds to the argument forwarded by Japan Whaling 
Association that preventing Japan from foregoing whale as a cultural food is 
equivalent to ‘Americans being asked to stop eating hamburgers’ (Japan Whaling 
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Association, 2005). In Japan, the average annual consumption of whale meat is less 
than 30 grams per person so the average Japanese eats 40 times as much meat in 
hamburgers compared to whale (Greenpeace Japan, 1998-2005). This is somewhat 
confirmed by Seiji Ohsuma, Director of the Institute of Cetacean Research who 
stated that annual consumption of whale per capita ‘was only about 30 grams’ 
(Greenpeace Japan, 1998-2005). The potential threat here is the fact that whale 




The younger generation may pose the greatest threat to pro-whaling interests. 
Danaher (1996) found that Japanese between the age of 20 to 29 years, show the 
greatest concern for the environment than any other age group. However, Japan 
rates high on pragmatism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance, and fairly high on 
power distance’ (Deresky, 2002:85-86). This combination of uncertainty avoidance 
and high power distance indicates that challenging authority goes against the social 
ethos. Danaher suggests that ‘the triumvirate of business, bureaucratic and political 
establishments is perceived to continue its dominance over Japanese society and 
gives little encouragement to ordinary Japanese people to show their dissatisfaction 




A return to commercial whaling is also likely to negatively affect the lucrative whale 
watching industry worldwide, something which could cause widespread discontent 
and anger against pro-whaling nations. In Australia, the whale watching industry 
generates more than 100 million dollars annually (Murray, 2005). Until recently whale 
watching attracted more than 277,000 tourists to Iceland and generated 
approximately US 8.5 million dollars in 2001. When compared to the 3 to 4 million 
US dollars of annual revenue that commercial whaling generated in Iceland between 
1986 and 1989, it is understandable why Iceland’s government responded 







Japan is perceived to flout the rules of the International Whaling Commission by 
carrying out commercial whaling under the guise of ‘scientific research’, thus 
exposing the country to a potential image problem (Greenpeace, 2005). Japan 
maintains that the International Whaling Commission is deviating from its original 
objective to promote ‘the orderly development of the whaling industry’. Japan 
Whaling Association attributes this to the fact that the International Whaling 
Commission is now controlled by a majority of anti-whaling groups, backed up by 
anti-whaling non-governmental organisations, which have effectively stopped 
commercial whaling. In addition, Japan Whaling Association asserts that the 
International Whaling Commission is now violating the Vienna Convention regarding 
the interpretation of international treaties requiring signatories to act in ‘good faith’ 




The rapid growth of the internet and other communication technologies have played 
a significant role in threatening the existence of global whaling. Such technological 
advances have increased the voice and power of anti-whaling groups such as 
Greenpeace. These organisations are able to disseminate information to a huge 
global audience and encourage anti-whaling protests through mechanisms such as 
rallies and boycotts (Henke, 2004). In order to remain in power, governments are 
inclined to act according to the will of their citizens and vote against pro-whaling 




Global trade dependencies are a reality of the economy in which pro-whaling nations 
operate (see Figure 5). Belonging to multilateral trade agreements such as the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) and Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) leaves pro-whaling nations open to the 
threat of disciplinary action through such mechanisms as trade sanctions. For 
example, the United States Government expressed ‘extreme disappointment’ at 
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Iceland’s decision to commence scientific whaling and to sell the remaining whale 
meat to Japan. The United States threatened to review options for trade sanctions 
under the Pelly Agreement ‘which mandates US State Department take action 
against countries that are undermining international agreements (such as CITES) to 
protect endangered species’ (Greenpeace, 2005).  
 
Global environmental concerns could also damage the image of the Japanese 
Whaling Industry. Whale products are contaminated with organochlorins including 
PCBs which are known to ‘damage the development of the young and affect 
reproduction’. In addition, the blubber of some whales has even been classified as 
toxic waste (Greenpeace, 2005). In 2000, Seiji Ohsuma, Director of the Institute of 
Cetacean Research confirmed substantial toxicity levels in Minke whales on the 
domestic Japanese market (Greenpeace Japan, 1998-2005) – a factor which could 
indeed damage the image of whale products and further lower switching costs to 
substitute meat sources.  
 
Japan has been accused of using the promise of aid to small, impoverished nations 
‘in order to gain appreciation of Japan’s position’ on whaling issues (Bailey et al, 
2002; Earth Island Journal, 2001-2002; Russell, 2003). These accusations have 
been strenuously denied by the Japanese government. Ironically, Greenpeace has 
also been accused of using its funds to entice support from less developed nations. 
Both sides actively seek support from other countries to boost their supporter 
numbers in crucial International Whaling Commission votes which require 75% of 




Figure 5: Current Global Environmental Conditions by Segment 






The main whaling 
countries are Japan, 





methods have been 
developed and are in 
use by other countries 
Economic: 
Whaling does not 
provide strong 
economic gains for 
a country, but is 
seen more as 
political influence 
Global: 
Environmental politics will 
continue to increase due to costs 
of environmental protection and 
a need for change in development 
strategies and production 
techniques. Global pressure 
against whaling is increasing due 
to environmental awareness and 
the increase in corporate social 
responsibility. 
Political/Legal: 
There is global political 
pressure to stop whaling. 
Also, Japan feels that if 
they give in to whaling 
pressure, harvesting 
other marine resources 




consider themselves victims 
of sanctimonious foreigners 
practising cultural and 
culinary imperialism. 
Impact on Strategy: 
 Protection of the whaling industry will prevent restrictions or attacks on the fisheries industries 
 Japan has been recruiting other International Whaling Commission nations to support the whaling 
industry, paying more than $160 million in fisheries aid to six Caribbean nations between 1987 and 2000. 
Also, Panama, Morocco and the Republic of Guinea received a total of $14.6 million from Japan in 2002. 
All of these nine countries voted against the conservation committee . 
 Japan emphasises the cultural aspects of whaling, joining with other pro-whaling nations. 
 Japan maintains that new technologies are not as useful in determining necessary information e.g. age, as 
a tactic to keep the hope of commercial whaling alive. 
 Japan continues research and monitoring of whale populations as part of their environmental duty. 
15 
 
KARION Consultants’ Report 
 
Concerned about the increasing negative publicity that its pro-whaling global 
strategies have encountered, the Japanese government contacted KARION, a 
leading Strategic Sustainable Management Consultancy firm, to conduct a strategic 
analysis of the Japanese Whaling Industry. The consultancy firm applied Porter’s 
(1979) Five Forces Model to conduct the study (see Figure 6) and submitted its 
preliminary report. Porter (1979) postulated that the following five forces would 
impact on an organisation’s behaviour in a competitive market: 
 The rivalry existing between sellers in the market 
 The power exerted by the customers in the market 
 The impact of suppliers on the sellers 
 The potential threat of new sellers entering the market 
 The threat of substitute products becoming available in the market 
 
Porter (1979) argued that to formulate appropriate strategies in order to succeed in 
their markets, organisations must have an understanding of the nature of these 
forces and the potential impact on their operations. KARION assumed that there was 
no distinction between individual players in the Japanese whaling industry and the 
industry as a whole. Rather, the different nations participating in the industry were 
considered competitors/individual players. KARION based its assumption on the fact 
that at present, there is only one main company in Japan, that is involved in whaling. 
This company is Kyodo Senpaku and it employs around 300 people. Some 
employees are skilled in whaling while others specialise in filleting and dissecting 
whales (The Economist, 2000). A summary of KARION’s report is given below.  
 
Threat of New Entrants 
 
KARION found that the threat of new entrants to the whaling industry is low. 
Differentiation by product is difficult as the demand for ‘freshness’ cannot be met 
when whale meat is delivered as a frozen bi-product of scientific research either from 
Japan, Norway or Iceland. Economies of scale are also difficult to achieve as the 
product is restricted to quotas set by the International Whaling Commission. Should 
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Japan be successful in resuming commercial whaling, it already has first mover 
advantages in know-how and facilities. Japan specialises in the mass production and 
automation of both factories and whaling ships – a result of heavy investments in the 
1960s (Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society, 2005). Finally, current government 
ownership and control of the whaling industry implies that new competitors would 
face significant barriers to entry as access to production, distribution channels and 
whaling facilities are carefully regulated (The Economist, 2000).  
 
Bargaining Power of Suppliers 
 
The bargaining power of suppliers to the Japanese market is high. There are a few 
dominant suppliers of whale products to the Japanese market. As the primary 
supplier, it is evident that the Japanese whaling industry under direct control of the 
government, would possess significant bargaining power over fish wholesalers and 
retailers such as restaurants (The Economist, 2000). Effectively, as the government 
sets prices for whale products prior to distribution, it would seem there is no place for 
any form of bargaining. As for the other supplier nations of Norway and Iceland, their 
bargaining power is evidenced by the high prices paid for whale meat by Japan 
(Greenpeace, 2005). Further, the supply of whale meat is tightly controlled by quotas 
under the International Whaling Commission rules (Parry, 2005).  
 
Bargaining Power of Buyers 
 
The bargaining power of buyers is low because of the limited supply of whale meat. 
This can exacerbate if consumer demand increases significantly. Naturally, buyers 
would want to pay the lowest possible price in order to receive higher profits from the 
‘on-sell’. However, as the Japanese Whaling Industry controls prices, there is little 
possibility for negotiation even though fish wholesalers purchase almost eight 
percent of government stocks. Again, albeit a united coalition of Japanese fish 
wholesalers, success in lobbying for lower prices would prove difficult against the 
‘triumvirate’ of business, bureaucratic and political establishments (Danaher, 1996).  
 




There is a medium threat of substitute products. Since the introduction of 
International Whaling Commission regulations there has been a growing threat of 
substitute products such as dolphin and porpoise meat which are passed off as 
whale meat (Ishihara & Yoshii, 2000). As retail prices can fetch extraordinary high 
prices of 3,500 yen (US $35) per 100 grams for whale meat and 4,000 yen (US $40) 
per 100 grams for some whale bacon there are two consequences (Greenpeace 
Japan, 1998-2005). The first is poaching and smuggling, which threatens to 
undermine the market for legal products (Greenpeace Japan, 1998-2005) and the 
second is a lowering of switching costs to other meats. Fresher higher quality 
products such as tuna, salmon and Kobe beef could be purchased at a lower cost. 
All firms compete by offering a substitute for another’s product(s). “The more 
attractive the price performance alternative offered by substitutes, the firmer the lid 
on industry profits” (Porter, 1979). 
 
Japan consumes tuna and livestock produce as substitutes for whale meat, so as to 
include animal protein in their diet. The demand for tuna has therefore increased and 
has resulted in overfishing from other countries. Plunging global fish stocks, along 
with a growing taste for sushi in China and the West, make Japan very uneasy about 
its future access to fresh seafood. So holding a firm line on the sustainable 
harvesting of whales, the argument goes, can help stave off a larger fight over more 
important fishing rights down the road (Sekiguchi, 2007). 
 
Due to International Whaling Commission sanctions, the whaling industry will always 
struggle to compete with substitute products like tuna, as whale meat is decreasing 
in popularity and at the same time, becoming more expensive. Given the limited 
availability and the fact that many young Japanese have not been brought up with 
whale meat, the current generation does not show much interest in consuming this 
product. However, stringent regulations also help to create a perceived uniqueness 
and delicacy. This can help to increase the demand for whale meat and generate a 
price premium. By maintaining this niche market, the role that whaling plays in the 
cultural identity of Japan is expected to keep the market for whale meat relatively 
healthy. 
 




The definition of competitors in this context is complex. On the one hand, Norway 
and Iceland do not really compete with the Japanese whaling industry and actually 
supplement Japan’s limited quota of whale meat. From this viewpoint, these nations 
provide the opportunity to work as an industry cluster and lobby for resumption of 
commercial whaling. On the other hand, there is a coalition of anti-whaling nations 
threatening to stave off any attempts at resuming commercial whaling. As Masayuki 
Komatsu, Counsellor for the Fisheries Agency states whale meat ‘does not sell well 
any more’ (Greenpeace Japan, 1998-2005). The combination of slow growth in an 
industry that is highly criticised by the international community creates a substantial 
amount of rivalry. The Norwegian industry is Japan’s primary competitor. In the past, 
the whaling industry in the two countries have remained separate. However, as the 
demand for whale products in Japan was quite high, Norway saw an opportunity to 
‘off-sell’ to Japan, parts of whale that Norwegians do not use. Norway hunts Minke 
whales only for their meat, but in January of 2000 they announced that they would 
start exporting other whale bi-products (mainly blubber) to Japan (Bryant, 2000). 
This could pose a limited threat to the Japanese industry. Since most of the whaling 
costs are recovered from Norwegian consumers, Norway can actually sell these bi-
products to Japan at highly discounted prices.  
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The current economic crisis has demonstrated that global markets are truly 
integrated. The sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US housing industry has destroyed 
world financial markets and sent several countries into recession. In November 
2008, economists stated that Japan was in recession after two quarters of negative 
growth. Global trade forms the lifeblood of several Japanese manufacturing 
industries such as automobiles and electronics. Japanese entrepreneurs have spent 
their entire life building powerful brands such as Honda, Toyota and Panasonic. 
Many Japanese wonder whether the rigid pro-whaling global strategies of the 
Japanese government will eventually result in a global consumer backlash against 
Japan and destroy its export markets. In addition, the new generation of 
environmentally conscious Japanese youth are growing increasingly uncomfortable 
with the rapid depletion of whales, which is seen by many as an endangered 
species. Many Japanese wonder whether the immediate financial rewards from 
whaling can really justify the significant long term economic and social risks. 
 




1. Identify the most important factors in the macro-environment and discuss their 
impact on the Japanese Whaling Industry? 
 
2. Do you believe that the tactics adopted by the Japanese to hunt whales are “cruel 
and inhumane”? What strategies can Japan adopt to deal with the allegations of 
cruelty? 
 
3. Using Porter’s (1979) Five Forces Model, critically assess the Japanese Whaling 
Industry? 
 
4. Based on the above analysis, do you believe that it is in Japan’s strategic interest 
to continue large scale Whaling? Justify your answer with a detailed explanation? 
 
5. To what extent will commercial whaling impact the image of Japan and its long 
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